Thousands of articles have called the December attack against Sony a wake-up call to industry. Regardless of whether the attacker was the North Korean government, a disgruntled former employee, or a group of random hackers, the attack showed how vulnerable a large organization can be, and how devastating the publication of its private correspondence, proprietary data, and intellectual property can be.
But while companies are supposed to learn that they need to improve their security against attack, there’s another equally important but much less discussed lesson of the Sony attacks: companies should have an aggressive deletion policy.
One of the social trends of the computerization of our business and social communications tools is the loss of the ephemeral. Things we used to say in person or on the phone we now say in e-mail, by text message, or on social networking platforms. Memos we used to read and then throw away now remain in our digital archives. Big data initiatives mean that we’re saving everything we can about our customers, on the remote chance that it might be useful later.
Everything is now digital, and storage is cheap — why not save it all?
Sony illustrates the reason why not. The hackers published old e-mails from company executives that caused enormous public embarrassment to the company. They published old e-mails by employees that are resulting in class-action lawsuits against the company. They published old documents. They published everything.
If Sony had had an aggressive data deletion policy, much of that couldn’t have been stolen and published. Saving data brings with it a security risk: the risk of exposure. The exposure could be accidental. It could be the result of data theft, as happened to Sony. Or it could be the result of litigation. Whatever the reason, the best security against these eventualities is not to have the data in the first place.
An organizational deletion policy makes sense. Customer data should be deleted as soon as it isn’t immediately useful. Internal e-mails can probably be deleted after a few months, and other documents in one to two years. There are exceptions, of course, and individuals should be able to flag documents and correspondence for longer retention. But unless there are laws requiring an organization to save a particular type of data for a prescribed length of time, data deletion should be the norm.
This has always been true, but many organizations have forgotten it in the age of big data. I hope we’ll all remember it now.
- Tracing, not Tracking (by Army General (2S) Watin-Augouard, Founder of the FIC) Legal Issues
- The “right to be forgotten”, a relative right (by Army General (2S) Watin-Augouard, Founder of the FIC) Legal Issues
- Why cybersecurity is a human rights issue, and it is time to start treating it like one (by Deborah Brown & Anriette Esterhuysen, Association for progressive communications) Legal Issues
- EncroChat: Deciphering of the End-to-End Encryption Service Used by Criminals Cybercrime
- Preserving Digital Footprints and Cyber Resilience: Training the Swiss Police (by Sébastien JAQUIER, Deputy Head of ILCE) Cybercrime
- Ransomware in Six Questions (by the Ministerial Delegation to the Security Industries and the Fight Against Cyberthreats, French Ministry of the Interior) Cybercrime
Cyber risks management
- The great cybersecurity challenge (by William Lecat, General Secretariat for Investment) Cyber risks management
- RSSI/CISO: The “swiss army knife” of cybersecurity! (by Delphine Chevallier, DG, Thalia NeoMedia) Cyber risks management
- Presentation of the EBIOS Risk Manager method (by the EBIOS Club) Cyber risks management